Response to Swineburne?
Introduction — The Detached Observer
A recurring challenge in theological discussions regarding the Judeo-Christian concept of God revolves around the claims that (Ia) God is omniscient, possessing complete knowledge of events before they occur—known as divine foreknowledge—and (IIa) the concern over how this knowledge might affect human free will, raising questions about whether it predisposes human choices. Now, an initial response might be to adopt the Causal Direction Strategy, prefacing God’s foreknowledge with chosen future events, but this still implies that certain events are inevitable and predetermined, as they are linked with our characters (Evans 2018). To address this, Boethius, a Roman philosopher from the early Middle Ages, introduced what is now called the Boethian Solution. The solution claims that God is not constrained by a sequential account of time but exists in an “eternal present,” where all events occur simultaneously for Him (Evans 2018). In this view, divine foreknowledge does not apply to God as He exists entirely outside of time, knowing all events at once without interfering, thereby preserving free will.
Swinburne argues this solution fails because a timeless, non-interactive God weakens the concept of a personal God, often central to theism, redefining omniscience without foreknowledge in the process. In this paper, I will explore the extent to which a personal God can be both non-temporal and omniscient. I will then present my own argument, offering a charitable interpretation of Swinburne’s personal God while attributing greater omniscience.
Swineburne’s Rejection — The Temporal Participant
Swinburne begins by arguing that God's omniscience must be redefined in a way that respects both His knowledge and the consequence of human choices. He contends that it is metaphysically impossible—in that, there is contradiction—for anyone, including God, to know infallibly what will be chosen before the choice is made (Swinburne 2016). The contradiction arises because freedom implies that one has the option to choose otherwise, while infallible knowledge finds the opposite—that the outcome is fixed and unchangeable, creating a logical inconsistency (Swinburne 2016). Swinburne’s success then depends on three points (Ib) Humans or objects alone must advance events within time, (IIb) Causality of events can only move forwards, never simultaneously or backward, and (IIIb) God is only personal and preserves free will if and only if he exists in a time without conclusively knowing future events (Swinburne 2016). In this section, we will briefly go through each point of Swinburne’s argument and then explore how it might be extended with my suggestion.
When an external force, defined in any form, controls how a cause (event A) leads to an effect (event B), it suggests that the outcome of the sequence may be predetermined or influenced by something beyond our control. Swinburne believes this complicates things and can be simplified by connecting cause and effect to what is inherent (Crocker 2020). What is inherent is essentially what we have observed or experienced in the past—a combination of intent and action in interplay. Notice, there is an awareness of causing an effect that comes from the intentional will to have caused it. For instance, when you decide to turn on a light, you recognize that your intention to flip the switch is what causes the light to turn on (Swinburne 2016). In this case, you have intentionally willed the action to occur—mimicking your “causal influence or power” to enact an event as an effect (Swinburne 2016). Similarly, objects, because of their inherent properties, naturally produce effects simply by playing out their properties. Here, we might see a magnet causes the attraction of metal, where the property held is the cause and the pulling of the metal is the effect (Crocker 2020).
Next, by logically dismissing the possibility of simultaneous causation (where event A and event B happen at the same time) and backward causation (where event B occurs before event A), Swinburne concludes that events must follow a progressive temporal sequence, with event A necessarily preceding and being a requirement for event B (Swinburne 2016). He rejects the first type by explaining that a causal event brings a once non-existent effect into existence and continues this trend as a sequence of events unfolds—calling this process “fixing an event,” or ensuring the new event fully develops (Swinburne 2016). Note that, something that does not exist cannot occur on the same plane as something that does, as its cause is solely responsible for its existence. As we know, concerning the second type, having any prior knowledge of an event would undermine human free will. Even if events overlap, part of event A is fixed to allow event B to come to fruition, making the second event “fixable” (Swineburne 2016). To clarify, once an event is fixed, no future event can make it malleable again.
To reconcile, for Swinburne, God’s omniscience means knowing all logical possible outcomes for the future, but not the exact free human choices that will be made. He knows this based on the characteristics of the inanimate and the potential intentions of the animate, allowing Him to guide and assist us in the process of making our choices (Crocker 2020). This rejection of the Boethian, in turn, allows God to be both temporal and personal at the cost of limiting a “strong” sense of omniscience that some hold.
My Response — The Multivalent
However, what if, instead of removing divine foreknowledge from the definition of omniscience, we choose to redefine divine foreknowledge itself? Like Swinburne, though I do so more expressively, we both interpret divine foreknowledge as pertaining to the existence of logically possible events. But note, I want to enhance or expand the concept of omniscience, possibly with timelessness, which, I agree, is not possible if actualization is seen as a single path. Therefore, I posit, from God’s perspective, that all possibilities that could exist are seen as actualized, while the human experience is then about coming to realize one of these possibilities. We would then need to redefine what it means for God to be personal, a concept Swinburne might not fully accept, as this would imply God is no longer acting in the same conscious manner.
To keep this idea, I grant greater freedom to the human experience—not only the choice to freely realize possibilities but also the ability for each person to follow their own unique paths, rather than being confined to only one actualized world. Additionally, now that we have the ability to realize our extended potential, and assuming God is invested in the process of human realization as our creator, it is possible for God to maintain a similar partner-like relationship as before. As humans make decisions, they are simply navigating through these pre-existing possibilities. This would eliminate the necessity for the strictly sequential unfolding of events that Swinburne advocates.
Conclusion:
In conclusion, I expect that Swinburne, despite my efforts to incorporate aspects of his views, would ultimately challenge this perspective. My response to The Multivalent redefines what a personal God might look like, portraying Him as one who allows additional freedoms and engages with curiosity in order to be personal. But, (Ic) it is questionable if such a God would need to be curious, and (IIc) it is difficult to make up for a personal God who is defined as interacting with individuals in real-time. Therefore, it is up to consideration whether or not I ultimately sacrificed or added benefit to the human experience while building on omniscience. However, it would be intriguing to explore this further, as the concept of multiple actualized worlds rather than a singular one is quite unique.
References (APA 7):
[1] Swinburne, Richard. "Causation, Time, and God’s Omniscience." Topoi, 13 May 2016, SpringerLink, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11245-016-9396-x.
[2] Crocker, Owen. "Richard Swinburne’s False Dilemma." PhilArchive, 2020, https://philarchive.org/rec/CRORSF-3.
[3] Evans, Jonathan. "Boethius and the Causal Direction Strategy." PhilArchive, 2018, https://philarchive.org/rec/EVABAT-4.